Tag: "Transit"

Take a Train – Buses are too Complicated?

Apparently, when it comes to making a mass transit choice between trains and buses when travelling around town, people should pick the train.

From the Congress for the New Urbanism blog:

Why Buses Are Inferior

Critics of rail often argue that buses are superior; they are cheaper, more flexible and (sometimes) run almost as fast.  But in a recent blog post, Houston planning student Maggie Colson explains why trains are better than buses, even if the train isn’t much faster:

The train system was much easier to maneuver than the bus system. I found the bus system to be more complicated because you had to find the correct bus stop with the bus number labeled on it. In addition, you could easily end up going in the wrong direction – the buses did not have the directions labeled like the trains. On the bus you also had to know where you needed to get off. Unlike the train system, the bus did not stop at every stop and instead you had to push a button to request for the bus to stop. While this is not necessarily an issue once you know the route, trying to navigate for the first time was stressful. Without the use of my smartphone, I would not have found or gotten off at the correct bus stops.

In other words, with buses you really have to know what you are doing.

Ignoring the recent rail disaster in London, are buses inferior to rail?

May 04, 2015 | 5 comments | by

Recognize All HOT Lanes as Fixed Guideways for Transit

Our recommendations for reforming surface transportation policy have been so well received that we want to offer two more ideas. Our latest recommendation focuses on high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes that reduce congestion and provide a virtual guideway for express bus service. My colleague Robert Poole and I recommend that the federal statute be changed so that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) counts all high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes count as “fixed guideway miles.”

Federal transit policy recognizes that an HOV lane converted to a variably tolled HOT lane provides buses with a “virtually exclusive guideway,” since variable pricing permits buses and cars to travel uncongested even during peak periods. Such HOT lane miles are counted toward a metro area’s total of “fixed guideway miles” for funding purposes, if used by transit buses. But the Federal Transit Administration withholds this designation for HOT lanes added as new capacity, even though such lanes function identically to those converted from HOV lanes. Region-wide BRT/express bus service will be fostered by creating seamless HOT networks. But a large fraction of such networks will be new capacity, since most freeways do not have HOV lanes to convert.

Changing the policy will require two modifications. First, revise the definition of “fixed guideway miles” to include all HOT lanes, whether HOV conversions or new capacity. This would acknowledge the functional identity of priced lanes as virtual fixed guideways, regardless of how they came about. Second, permit transit agencies to use New Starts and Small Starts grant funds to pay for a portion of new-capacity HOT lanes, based on the projected share of passenger miles of travel that will be generated by bus service on the new-capacity HOT lane.

This change would provide travel options and improve express bus service in the U.S. Very few state DOTs or transit agencies can afford to develop bus-only lanes on freeways, since the vast majority of their capacity would be unused even during peak periods. HOV lanes are frequently over-used, providing little or no time-saving advantage for express-bus service. HOT lanes are a proven way to use all the capacity of a specialized lane, with buses and paying vehicles both benefiting from congestion management via variable pricing. Current FTA policy artificially distinguishes between HOT lanes based on how they came about, thereby discouraging creation of seamless networks that require construction of new lanes. Under the second part of this policy, transit agencies could partner with a toll agency or state DOT to jointly develop new HOT/BRT lanes, sharing in any net toll revenues (after covering capital/debt-service and operating costs) in proportion to the agency’s contribution to the capital costs of the project. Thus, in addition to helping create the network of virtually exclusive bus lanes, the transit agency would receive part of any net toll revenue as an additional ongoing source of revenue.

This change would not cost taxpayers a dime, since it would merely create new options to encourage HOT/BRT lanes and networks. It would give transit agencies and highway agencies a new incentive to work together creating HOT/BRT networks, a highly cost-effective way to increase transit infrastructure.

Apr 13, 2015 | Leave a Comment | by

Simplify USDOT Regulations for Transportation Planning

Today, I want to offer the sixth of my recommendations to reform U.S. surface transportation policy. My colleague David Hartgen and I suggest simplifying Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations regarding transportation planning.

Since 1964, federal laws and amendments (23 USC 134 and 49 USC 5303) have required that states and urbanized areas exceeding 50,000 population carry out a short-term and long-range “continuing, cooperative and comprehensive multimodal transportation planning process” as a condition for federal aid. Sensible at first, the “3C” process now mandates a wide range of required assessments, including air quality, environmental justice, congestion management, safety, maintenance, efficiency, freight, pedestrian-bike, economic growth, fuel consumption, and other requirements. Although some requirements have been eased for smaller regions, recent regulations call for expanded time horizons and new “planning factors.” More rules for climate change, international trade, active transportation and sustainability are likely. These requirements and frequent updates have a negative impact on smaller regions with fewer staff.

For regions with fewer than 200,000 people, eliminate all long-range transportation planning mandates and require 10-year TIP (Transportation Incentive Program) updates. For regions greater than 200,000 population, eliminate or reduce regulations for air quality monitoring and conformity, environmental justice, congestion management, economic impact, safety, fuel consumption, and 40-year planning horizons. For the TIP, remove the option that projects come from a long-range transportation plan. Review other requirements for possible reduction or elimination.

Recent reviews of metropolitan transportation plans find that many are dense documents full of feel-good unachievable goals only marginally related to transportation. Frequent update cycles mean “planning never stops.” Worse, they generally ignore rising congestion and infrastructure maintenance, and depend heavily on federal/state resources for implementation. But the federal role is declining as local, state and private roles increase. After completion, most plans are ignored and shelved until the next update. The cost of this wasted and inefficient planning is substantial — about $500M annually. In short, transportation planning has become a convenient catch-all for pushing other local goals, and a hurdle for self-certification and funding continuation, not a sensible effort to establish future transportation visions.

These changes would bring federal requirements into line with the declining federal role in local transportation issues. Most projects are local in impact, not national. The cost of current planning, about $1B annually, could probably be halved, leaving more resources for implementation, which would speed project development and create jobs. Localities would have more control over essentially local transportation decisions.

Apr 06, 2015 | Leave a Comment | by

U.S. Energy Infrastructure Still Lacking

Energy booms, whether from oil or gas, will continue as both technology develops and more resources are discovered. However, each energy boom puts a strain on our existing energy infrastructure. For instance, oil can be transported by truck, ship, rail and pipeline. Pipeline is the safest and most reliable way to transport oil. Even with 185,000 miles of liquid petroleum pipeline across the United States, there is just not enough to transport the huge volume in the current boom. The lack of pipeline has increased transportation by rail and rail accidents during this time.oil_by_rail

  • The recent increase in transportation of oil by rail has increased the number of rail accidents.
  • In 2014, 70 percent of petroleum products and crude oil were shipped by pipeline, while 3 percent was shipped by rail.
  • A recent study by Fraser affirms their safety by reporting transporting oil by pipeline is 30 times less harmful than by train.

More and more oil is extracted every day and our storage capacity is overflowing. Two things need to happen that will greatly alleviate this situation. First, more pipelines are needed to transport all of this new oil. Second, all of this oil needs a place to go. Building more storage capacity only temporarily alleviates the problem. The crude oil export ban needs to be lifted so that the oil can get out of the over capacity storage units and enter the energy market.

Apr 06, 2015 | 1 comment | by

Eliminate Air Quality Standards for Regions that Meet Standard

Today, I want to offer the fifth of my recommendations to reform U.S. surface transportation policy. My colleague David Hartgen and I recommend that the Clean Air Act of 1990 be amended in two ways. First, eliminate the conformity requirement for regions meeting clean air standards. Second, review regions not in conformity every 10 years, after new census data has been released.

The Clean Air Act of 1990 (CAA) requires each region currently in non-attainment with air quality standards to submit plans demonstrating that it will be in compliance in the future. For transportation, each region must show that its’ Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) “conforms” to the State Implementation Plan for air quality improvement. In the DOT Rules (40 CFR 93), this means that the region’s TIP projects will, as a whole, not increase future emissions above the no-build level or above budgeted emissions.

The present rule requires even very small regions to conduct extensive forecasting of air pollution if they were ever in non-attainment of air quality standards. But virtually all of the future reduction in regional air pollution will be caused by cleaner vehicles, not by local transportation actions. Recent reviews of the air quality plans of 48 regions found that every region predicted a 30-50% reduction in vehicle emissions over 20 years even as travel increased, and that the TIP would reduce emissions by only 0.25-0.5% — way too small to be significant. Further, the conformity rule requires reduction of emissions (measured in tons of pollutant) but the CAA standards are for concentrations (measured in parts per billion in air). Therefore, there is no direct connection between the rule’s emissions analysis and the CAA’s concentration requirements.

Very few regions have been cited for non-conforming plans from among the literally hundreds submitted. A 2003 GAO analysis found that only five regions out of 200+ revised their plans based on conformity, and that frequent updating was administratively burdensome. No region has actually lost federal funds as a result of non-conformity. For major projects environmental impact statement analysis already requires additional air quality analysis, so requiring regions to do it twice is duplicative and burdensome. In this way the rule has become an administrative hurdle that duplicates later needed work, does not improve local air quality, and requires huge administrative effort to ensure certification for federal funds.

Regions — particularly the 400+ smaller ones — will have significant relief of administrative burden. Assuming that the conformity analysis costs $20,000 per certification, administrative time, and administration costs, this change would save nearly $8M that could be better spent on effective transportation planning. Air quality would not degrade as a result of this change.

Apr 01, 2015 | Leave a Comment | by

Eliminate Federal Gas Tax Funding for Non-Highway Uses

Today, I want to offer the fourth of my recommendations to reform U.S. surface transportation policy. I advise eliminating federal-aid gas tax funding for all non-highway uses.

The federal highway transportation program is structured as a users-pay/users-benefit system with fuel taxes funding construction and maintenance of the Interstate and national highway system. Over the last 30 years, the program has diverted an increasing percentage of its funds to transit, bicycling, walking, smart growth, transportation museums, weed removal and other non-federal transportation purposes. While these programs have value, they also reduce the funding available for federal aid to highways; this has jeopardized interstate commerce. Eliminating federal aid funding for all non-highway uses will return the federal highway program to a users-pay/users-benefit program that spends limited resources on the most critical infrastructure.

U.S. government policy is based on the principle of federalism where the federal and state government share legislative responsibilities. In transportation, the federal government funds interstate passenger and goods movement using federal aid highways, aviation, inland waterways, and ports. Traditionally, other transportation modes have been funded by state and local governments. While transit and active transportation are important in certain states and regions, such systems are not federal in nature and should not be funded by the federal government. Most local governments and some states provide substantial funding for transit. Federal government funding makes up less than 30% of the revenue for the most important transit agencies such as the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The funding of these modes from federal aid amounts to a cross-subsidy from highway users to other modes.

Federal transportation funding is limited. With little bipartisan interest in increasing the gas tax or embracing an alternate funding mechanism coupled with increasing vehicle fuel efficiency, federal gas tax receipts must be targeted as effectively as possible. Fuel tax diversions significantly reduce funding for highways.

While transit is important in many communities, it should be funded by farebox revenue and with supplementary local funding that does not come from federal roadway funding. U.S. transportation policy is predicated on a users-pay/users-benefit system. Potential funding sources for transit include local general tax revenue and value capture. (Value capture uses increases in land values resulting from highway and transit projects to finance infrastructure improvements.)

This change could devote more revenue to highways. Assuming all non-roadway funds are dedicated back to roadways, under Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) transit receives approximately $11 billion per year. Additionally, there is approximately $5 billion per year in highway funding that is flexed to transit, bicycling, walking or non-transportation purposes. This totals $16 billion in additional highway funding per year, or about 1/3 of federal gasoline taxes.

Mar 30, 2015 | 1 comment | by

Privately Built High Speed Rail in Texas

Ever since Japan built the first high-speed rail line in the world linking Tokyo to Osaka in 1964, U.S. train advocates have been lobbying for true high-speed rail in the U.S. While France, Germany, Spain and recently China have built high-speed rail systems, the U.S. has resisted for many reasons. High-speed rail works most effectively transporting customers between dense city centers with robust transit systems and low rates of car ownership. A popular existing passenger rail system and higher costs of car ownership are important factors as well.

The U.S. has never fared particularly well in these categories for a number of reasons. First of all, car ownership in U.S. cities was far higher in the 1970’s than in Europe or Japan due to a more robust roadway network. In addition, U.S. cities are generally less dense than European cities. And U.S. city transit networks are much more skeletal making them less effective. Also U.S. taxes on gasoline are much lower making car travel cheaper than in Europe and Japan. Furthermore, U.S. rail tracks are dedicated to freight, creating the most efficient freight rail network in the world but limiting options for passenger rail.

Despite these challenges, in 2009, President Obama promised a national high-speed rail network. However, six years later that promise is nothing but a dream. The Obama administration strategy was flawed from the start. Instead of focusing on the most fiscally realistic place to build HSR, such as the northeast corridor, President Obama disbursed money to 38 states to build new rail but also to upgrade existing rail. The only high-speed rail project to begin construction is the California line from Los Angeles to San Francisco by way of the Central Valley. However, this project has a more than $50 billion funding hole, takes a circuitous route through the Central Valley making it physically impossible for the train to meet its travel time obligations, and is causing politicians to bend environmental review and ballot question intent laws. The project has no Republican support and is rapidly losing support from Democrats including the Lieutenant Governor. Most expect the project to be cancelled as soon as its major supporter, Jerry Brown, leaves office. High-speed rail’s track record in the U.S. has been one of almost complete failure.

All of these factors make potential high-speed rail success in the U.S. look doubtful at best.

However, there are several potential bright spots. The higher-speed Acela train operated by Amtrak on the northeast corridor has been a modest success. Train farebox revenue covers the full operating costs of the line. Many experts have speculated that a true 200-mile per hour high speed rail line would be even more successful financially. If this train could be operated by the private sector with competent management, which Amtrak has seldom provided, and be free of government restrictions such as Buy America, it might work. And if the private operator sought advice from successful rail operators in Japan instead of from the bungling bureaucrats advising the California and national rail lines, significant profits could be possible.

Two such lines are on the drawing boards. One is proposed for Florida linking Miami with Orlando International Airport. The other is proposed for Texas linking Dallas and Houston.

Let’s examine the Texas route from Dallas to Houston in a little more detail. The Texas line shares several characteristics with successful European and Japanese lines. Dallas to Houston is a popular air route, flown by three of the four largest airlines. Instead of trying to position the line in the middle of the highway or use existing tracks, the company is planning to build the line along a utility corridor. In addition to providing a dedicated right of way, such an alignment limits the number of folks living in the train’s path as people do not live in utility right of ways. The 250-mile flat distance between the two cities is perfect for high-speed rail. Finally, the metro areas each having more than 6 million folks are plenty big enough to serve as the endpoints.

However, there are several obstacles to the route as well. Neither metro area has an extensive transit system, nor the density to create such a system, so the train stations would have to feature many parking spaces. This is different from European or Japanese HSR. And whether folks living in the expansive suburbs especially near an airport would drive to the center city to take the train, versus drive to the airport is an open question. In both metro areas there are folks living in the train’s path. Living next to an Interstate highway is unpleasant; living next to a train would be unfeasible. The full cost of relocation would have to be offered to many homeowners, increasing the cost and opposition.

The biggest challenge is whether or not the system would need government funding. Texas Central Railway insists it does not. Regardless, since competitor modes, namely aviation and intercity bus are not subsidized, we should not be subsidizing HSR either.

The Texas high-speed rail proposal is intriguing. Proposed as a private operation with funding and guidance from Central Japan Railway Company the proposal is already far more promising than any of the Obama Administration’s previous lines. Nobody knows if such a private line can succeed, but Texas Central Railway certainly deserves a chance to try.

 

 

Mar 23, 2015 | 1 comment | by

Metro Transportation Plans Lack Transparency

Today, I want to offer the third of my recommendations to reform U.S. surface transportation policy. I request that Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) analyze their long-range transportation plans’ ability to reduce congestion.

Under federal law, MPOs are required to create Long Range Transportation Plans every four years (if deemed in non-attainment) or every five years otherwise, outlining their planned transportation investments and their reasons for making those investments. Some plans forecast that horizon-year congestion will be less if the plan is implemented compared with the no-build case, but in nearly all cases, future congestion (with the plan) will be greater — often significantly greater — than in the baseline year (today). Yet that fact is seldom made clear to citizens and taxpayers.

Requiring Long Range Transportation Plans to directly compare congestion levels in the horizon year with congestion levels in the baseline year, will allow citizens and taxpayers to judge whether or not the plan focuses enough effort on congestion reduction to ameliorate the situation.

According to the latest Urban Mobility Report from the Texas A&M Transportation Institute, traffic congestion in America’s 101 urbanized areas costs motorists $121 billion per year in wasted time and fuel. Most MPOs’ Long Range Plans give lip service to reducing congestion, but very few actually target their investments in such a way as to credibly project that 20 years of investment will yield less congestion than in the initial (baseline) year of the plan. If they make any comparison at all, most plans compare congestion after the plan’s implementation with what it would be under the no-build alternative. The models used to produce these plans do generate the information needed to compare horizon-year congestion with baseline-year congestion, but this comparison is almost never included. Citizens and taxpayers are led to believe that because congestion with the plan is marginally better than congestion under the no-build alternative, the plan is the best that can be accomplished. Yet most plans could do far more to reduce congestion if they focused their resources on the problem. The Urban Mobility Report shows that urbanized areas that have this focus can actually achieve significant reductions.

This requirement could provide substantial mobility improvements at a very small cost. To the extent that this motivates MPOs to focus more resources on actual congestion reduction, there will be traffic flow improvements, time-savings, reduced fuel use and reduced emissions. The cost of making this change in the planning process will be very low, since most MPOs already generate the needed information as part of their transportation modeling.

Mar 11, 2015 | Leave a Comment | by

Eliminate Transportation (TIGER) Grants

Approximately every six years, Congress reauthorizes U.S. surface transportation policy. One of these reauthorizations is overdue, providing an opportunity to make U.S. transportation policy more free-market oriented. I have chosen six programs or policies that badly need to be changed. Over the next two weeks, I will summarize each of these programs.

My first recommendation is to eliminate the Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants. The TIGER program is an executive agency discretionary funding program that supports road, rail, transit and port projects. Started in 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) also known as the Stimulus, TIGER is supposed to award funding based on merit. Unlike most federal programs, which appropriate money based on a formula set by Congress, the TIGER program is administered and audited by the executive branch.

Unfortunately, the executive branch’s administration of the TIGER program has failed to follow the rules and expectations of the program.

The program is supposed to achieve critical national objectives, yet more than 60 percent of the grants have supported local transit, pedestrian or bicycling projects. While such projects have a role, they are not national projects and should not be funded by a national-oriented program. Several of the road, rail and port projects are also locally oriented.

Projects are supposed to be selected based on “rigorous” criteria, but DOT uses vague metrics. For “livability,” the department’s definition is “Significantly enhance the creation of more convenient transportation options for the traveler,” which could mean almost anything project sponsors want it to mean.

Lower ranked projects are frequently funded while higher ranked projects are not. In the first round of TIGER grants, the agency funded almost as many “recommended” projects as “highly recommended” projects. In the fifth round of TIGER grants, DOT changed the ratings of some projects from “not recommended” and “recommended” to “highly recommended” in order to justify funding them.

The program provides limited information to applicants and the public. Despite three requests from the Government Accountability Office to provide better documentation of the review process and to release more information to applicants who fail to win grants and to taxpayers, USDOT has failed to provide more information as requested about the program.

Democratic districts have received a disproportionate share of the grants. In the third round of grants Democratic districts received 61% of the grants and 69% of the funding, despite comprising 49% of the total congressional districts. Democratic districts were overrepresented as award winners in all six rounds of TIGER Grants.

Since funds would be allocated by Congress we don’t expect eliminating the program will cost taxpayers anything. In fact, staff reductions could follow permitting executive branch employees to engage in other activities.

 

Mar 09, 2015 | Leave a Comment | by

California High Speed Rail Advocates Want to Ignore Law

The California high-speed rail project is an out-of-control train careening down the tracks. Everybody knows the project is a disaster in the making. But Governor Jerry Brown and California’s political elite are so enamored with being remembered, they are less concerned with whether it is in a good or a bad way. Earlier this month, the authority broke ground on the first planned section between Madera and Fresno.

For those keeping track, the proposed high speed rail line has no realistic funding plan and uses wildly optimistic and unrealistic ridership forecasts. It has violated the language of its 2008 bonds by providing far slower service than initially proposed. It plans to use gas tax funding from an environmental protection plan to help build the train even though the California Air Resources Board found that high speed rail will increase greenhouse gas emissions for the near term.

The past few months have brought one more twist. Since its inception, the rail authority has promised that the project would comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). But after plaintiffs filed seven different lawsuits, the California High Speed Rail Authority asked the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to invalidate these lawsuits arguing that the project only has to comply with federal guidelines that they say have been cleared because of regulatory approvals of the 114-mile Fresno to Bakersfield segment. In late December, the STB agreed with this dubious logic. However, the plaintiffs have promised to appeal and most experts doubt the Supreme Court will side with the STB.

A previous attempt by state lawyers to argue that CEQA was negated by federal approvals was rejected by a Sacramento appeals court. Further, the state Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of a bullet train case in a similar case.

The authority’s spokesman says this isn’t an attempt to get around CEQA just an attempt to “clarify” matters. But it is clear the only reason the authority does not want to go through CEQA is because it will slow down of potentially cancel construction of the rail line.

The federal Surface Transportation Board consists of three appointees of President Obama who has strongly supported rail with earmarked high-speed rail funding and Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants. So the authority is making an end-run around the law which they ideologically support to get the train built. And they are turning to their political friends in the federal bureaucracy to ensure they can get away with ignoring the law. How many laws and rules will California politicians ignore to get this train built?

 

Feb 16, 2015 | 1 comment | by
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